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Abstract
Acute lesions of the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in humans may induce a state of reality confusion marked
by confabulation, disorientation, and currently inappropriate actions. This clinical state is strongly associated with an
inability to abandon previously valid anticipations, that is, extinction capacity. In healthy subjects, the filtering of memories
according to their relation with ongoing reality is associated with activity in posterior medial OFC (area 13) and
electrophysiologically expressed at 220–300 ms. These observations indicate that the human OFC also functions as a
generic reality monitoring system. For this function, it is presumably more important for the OFC to evaluate the current
behavioral appropriateness of anticipations rather than their hedonic value. In the present study, we put this hypothesis to
the test. Participants performed a reversal learning task with intermittent absence of reward delivery. High-density evoked
potential analysis showed that the omission of expected reward induced a specific electrocortical response in trials signaling
the necessity to abandon the hitherto reward predicting choice, but not when omission of reward had no such connotation.
This processing difference occurred at 200–300 ms. Source estimation using inverse solution analysis indicated that it
emanated from the posterior medial OFC. We suggest that the human brain uses this signal from the OFC to keep thought
and behavior in phase with reality.
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Introduction
Acute lesions of the posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
or structures directly connected with it may induce a state of
dramatic reality confusion in human subjects: The patients
confabulate recent experiences that never took place, are
disoriented, confusing the time, place, and their current role,
and enact ideas (e.g., going to work) that do not apply to current
reality [1,2]. This state, variably called spontaneous confabulation
[3], confabulation with action [4], or behaviorally spontaneous
confabulation [2], emanates from an inability to suppress the
interference of memories that do not relate to the present [3,5,6].
Lesions involve the posterior medial OFC (area 13 and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex) or regions directly connected with
it [1,5,6,7,8,9]. In healthy subjects, the ability to filter out
memories that do not relate to present reality (memory filtering)
occurs at an early stage of memory evocation, at 220–300 ms [10].
It involves orbitofrontal area 13 and connected subcortical
structures [11,12] and is under dopaminergic modulation [13].
These observations show that the human OFC is critical for the
ability to adapt thought and behavior to ongoing reality. Current
theories on OFC functions offer no explanation for such a role.
The OFC is seen as a hedonic and decision-making centre that
optimizes behavior and choices on the basis of anticipated and
obtained rewards [14,15,16,17]. Indeed, single cell recordings in
animals revealed neurons in the OFC whose discharge rate reflects
the type [18], current value [16,19], occurrence [20,21] or
omission [20,22] of expected rewards [23]. A wealth of functional
imaging studies in humans confirmed the OFC’s role in the
processing or rewards [24,25,26,27,28] and extended the notion of
reward processing to abstract monetary reward [29,30,31].
Varying in details, these studies also showed an anatomical
diversity of different aspects of reward processing in the OFC
[30,31,32,33,34,35]. In particular, the lateral OFC was shown to
be involved in the coding of changes in reward contingencies
during probabilistic reversal learning [35,36]. Clinical studies, too,
focused on the processing of rewards, mostly money, after OFC
lesions [37,38,39] and did not consider an elementary faculty like
reality filtering. This may be due to the fact that the state of reality
confusion after acute OFC lesions is rare [2] and in most cases
transitory: within a few months, most patients act again in
agreement with reality and regain correct orientation in time and
space [8].
A striking feature of this reality confusion is that patients
continue to act according to ideas and plans that do not relate to
the present. We have, therefore, speculated that their primary
failure is an inability to adapt their thinking and behavior to the
fact that their –currently inappropriate- anticipations fail to occur;
the absence of expected outcomes fails to produce a signal
indicating discordance between their ideas (thoughts) and reality
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disconnected in the patients– has a particularly high density of
neurons that specifically fire when anticipated outcomes (rewards)
fail to occur [20,22]. In analogy to these observations in animals,
we thus hypothesized that the reality confusion of our patients
reflected absence of, or the inability to make use of, the
orbitofrontal signal which would normally indicate the non-
occurrence of anticipated outcomes, that is, the neural signal that
normally underlies extinction [2]. We obtained critical support for
this hypothesis in a clinical study: we found that disorientation and
behaviorally spontaneous confabulation in patients with OFC
lesions or amnesia were very strongly and specifically associated
with a failure to abandon a previously correct choice in a reversal
learning task once it was not followed by the expected outcome
anymore [40]. In contrast, the ability to subsequently learn a new
association was not predictive of orientation or behaviorally
spontaneous confabulation.
These findings suggest that the OFC might be at least as
important for processing the behavioral relevance as the hedonic
value of outcomes. While activation of the posterior medial OFC
in the processing of outcomes devoid of any tangible reward value
[41] and early signaling of behaviorally relevant absence of
outcomes at 200–300 ms in such a task [42] has been observed
before, the processing of behavioral relevance and hedonic loss of
the absence of anticipated rewards have never been directly
compared. In the present study, we used high-resolution event-
related potentials (ERP) to explore the electrocortical correlate of
reward delivery and reward omission with two situations of reward
omission: in one, the correctness of the previous choice was
confirmed and behavior could continue as before; in the other, the
hitherto correct choice had to be abandoned and a change of
choice was required in the next trial. Thus, both outcomes lacked
hedonic value but only one required abandonment of a previously
correct behavior. We hypothesized that the absence of reward
would induce an early electrocortical response (200–300 ms
[10,42]) only when it signaled a need to subsequently adapt
behavior, while it would induce either no such signal, or at another
point in time, when it had no behavioral relevance, that is, when
the previously valid anticipation remained valid. Apart from
traditional waveform analysis, we used advanced ERP topographic
mapping techniques to estimate the generators of the electrocor-
tical activity.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Eighteen right-handed healthy subjects (7 males, 11 females)
aged 2664.6 (mean 6 SD) years gave written, informed consent
to participate in the study. They were paid 20 Swiss francs per
hour and could earn additional money based on their perfor-
mance. The institutional Ethical Committee approved the study.
Procedure and Task
Participants performed a simple probabilistic reversal learning
task in which they had to predict behind which one of two colored
rectangles a ‘‘gambling set’’, that might provide reward or not, was
hidden (Figure 1). Stimuli were presented on a black background
on a 21-inch monitor with a resolution of 10246768 pixels using
e-prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Subjects
were told that the ‘‘gamble’’ would normally remain behind the
same rectangle but that it occasionally switched to the other
rectangle. They should base their choice on the outcome of the last
trial and refrain from guessing.
Trials started by the appearance of the two colored rectangles
(Figure 1A). After subjects had indicated their choice –the
rectangle where they expected the gamble to play– by pressing a
response key (right hand, index finger for the left-sided rectangle,
middle finger for the right-sided rectangle), the non-chosen
rectangle disappeared and a fixation cross appeared in the center
of the chosen rectangle (Figure 1B). After 1500 ms, the outcome
was presented in the form of a letter in the center of the rectangle
(Figure 1C), whose significance had been practiced before the
experiment. After 1000 ms, the screen turned black; 700 ms later,
the next trial started with the appearance of the two colored
rectangles.
Three letters (A, P, S), whose meaning varied between the
subjects, indicated the outcomes: Two letters indicated that the
subjects had actually chosen the correct rectangle, where the
gamble was playing. One of these letters indicated that they
received some money (5 cents, Reward trials). This was the most
frequent trial type (50% of all trials). The second letter indicated
that they had chosen the correct rectangle but that they obtained
no reward (No-Reward trials, approx. 25% of all trials). The third
letter indicated that there was no reward because the gamble was
not playing behind the chosen rectangle anymore (approx. 25% of
all trials, after 2 to 4 consecutive correct responses). As these trials
signaled the need to abandon the chosen rectangle on the next
trial, we called them Extinction trials, similar to our previous
studies [40,41,42,43]. These trials constituted the first phase of the
reversal (switch) to the alternate rectangle, which was completed
by the learning of the new stimulus-association on the next trial
when the alternate rectangle was again visible.
Incorrect responses put the counter of a trial sequence back to
zero; subjects again had to make 2 to 4 correct choices before an
Extinction trial. Incorrect responses were not analyzed because of
their scarcity (see Results). The main task consisted of three
experimental blocks of 140 trials each.
Figure 1. Design of the experiment. Trials had three steps: A, Two
differently colored rectangles were presented and subjects had to
predict by button press which one of the two rectangles hid a
‘‘gamble’’. B, After the choice, only the chosen rectangle remained on
the screen and a fixation cross appeared in its centre. C, 1500 ms later,
one of three possible letters indicating the outcome appeared in the
centre of the rectangle (outcome). The meaning of the letter was
individually chosen and practiced before the start of the experiment
(Table 1). After 1000 ms, the screen turned black; 700 ms later, the next
trial started. ERPs were time-locked to the appearance of the outcome
stimulus.
Outcome Monitoring
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(A, P, S) varied and was counterbalanced between participants.
Subjects familiarized with the letters’ meaning referring to their
session in 40-trial practice blocks of the ‘‘gamble’’ task. Rather
than presenting only the letters, as in the main task, outcomes in
the practice block were signaled by the highlighted letters
completed to whole words (Table 1). Training was repeated until
participants had less than 3 unforced errors and correctly reported
the meaning of each letter.
Analysis of behavioral data
The following behavioral data were obtained: Reaction times
(time to choose one rectangle after appearance of the two colored
rectangles; Figure 1A) and proportion of errors after the 3 trial
types. In addition, participants indicated at the end of the
experiment on a visual analogue scale (VAS, Likert scale from 1 to
10) how much they had liked the 3 outcome types (pleasantness
score) and how often they had expected them to occur (degree of
anticipation). These measures were compared using repeated
measures ANOVAs. Post-hoc tests of simple effects were
Bonferroni corrected.
EEG acquisition and preprocessing
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded continuously
using the Active-Two Biosemi EEG system (Biosemi V.O.F
Amsterdam, Netherlands) with 128 channels covering the entire
scalp. Signals were sampled at 512 Hz in a bandwidth filter of 0.1–
104 Hz. All analyses were conducted using Cartool Software
(http://brainmapping.unige.ch/Cartool.htm). Epochs of EEG
from 200 ms before to 800 ms after the onset of the outcome
stimulus were averaged for each subject and each condition. In
addition to a 6100 mV rejection artefacts criterion, EEG epochs
containing eye blinks and movements or other sources of transient
noise were excluded during the averaging procedure. Artefact
electrodes were interpolated using a spherical spline interpolation
[44]. Baseline correction was applied to the 200 ms prestimulus
period. Before group averaging, individual data were recalculated
against the average reference and bandpass filtered to 1–30 Hz.
The number of evoked potentials (ERPs) entering the analysis was
matched across conditions in each participant (mean 6 SD per
condition, 5467; min. 40, max. 60).
Waveform analysis
In order to allow comparison of our results with earlier studies,
we first examined amplitude differences of ERP traces at nine
electrode positions described in previous studies on outcome
processing and covering anterior, central, and posterior regions of
both hemispheres (corresponding to AF8, AF7, AFz, PO7, Pz,
PO8, Oz, FCz and Cz of the International 10–20 System). To
estimate periods of amplitude difference, we performed point-wise
paired t-tests over 800 ms for every 2 ms interval following
stimulus onset. Only differences extending over at least 20 ms at
p,.05 (Bonferroni corrected by the number of electrodes –1) were
retained and will be illustrated in the results section.
Topographic analysis
Amplitude variations of ERP traces do not allow distinguishing
between activation of different networks (with different potential
fields) or modulation of similar networks [45]. We therefore
applied a reference-free spatiotemporal analysis approach that
searches for topographical differences of the global scalp potential
maps between conditions across time [46,47,48]. Different map
configurations indicate different intracranial generator distribu-
tions [49]. The approach is based on a modified spatial k-means
clustering analysis [50] that determines the most dominant map
topographies and the periods during which they are present in the
data. This approach is based on the observation that scalp
topographies do not change randomly, but rather remain for a
period of time in a certain configuration and then rapidly switch to
a new stable configuration [51,52]. The periods of stability have
been called ‘‘functional microstates’’ [51,52,53] and are thought to
reflect the different information processing steps.
The cluster analysis was applied to the group-averaged ERPs of
the three outcome types (Reward trials, No-Reward trials,
Extinction trials). We further applied the constraint that a given
scalp topography must be observed for at least 20 ms in the group-
averaged data. Additionally, statistical smoothing was used to
eliminate temporally isolated scalp topographies with low strength
[50]. This topographic analysis method is independent of the
reference electrode and is insensitive to amplitude modulation of
the same scalp configuration across conditions, because topogra-
phies of normalized maps are compared [51]. The optimal
number of maps explaining the averaged data sets was determined
with the cross validation [50] and the Krzanowski-Lai criterion
[54].
In a second step, the appearance of maps identified in the
group-averaged data was statistically verified in the ERPs of the
individual subjects. To do this, each map was compared with the
moment-by-moment scalp topography of the individual subjects’
ERPs from each condition by strength-independent spatial
correlation [53,55,56]). That is, for each time point of the
individual subjects’ ERPs, the scalp topography was compared to
all maps and was labeled according to the one with which it best
correlated. It is important to note that this labeling procedure is
not exclusive, such that a given period of the ERP for a given
subject and stimulus condition is often labeled with multiple
template maps. Nonetheless, the results of the labeling reveal
whether a given ERP is more often described by one map rather
than another. Fitting thus allowed us to determine for what period
of time a given topography was observed in a given condition
across subjects. The Global Explained Variance (GEV) is the sum
of the explain variance weighted by the Global Field Power (GFP,
root mean square across the average-referenced electrode values at
a given instant in time [53,56]). The GFP represents the strength
of the maps. The GEV describes how well a map configuration
explains the individually obtained patterns of activity [45,53]. The
Table 1. Possible outcomes and their probability of
occurrence.
Letter Outcome type (Probability)
Reward
(50%)
No-Reward
(25%)
Extinction
(25%)
AA rgent
Money
Absent
Absent
Arre ˆt
Stop
PP oints
Points
Pas
No
Plus
No longer
SS ous
Coins
Sans
Without
Stop
Stop
For each subject, the three letters A, P, and S were used but their meaning was
chosen individually for each subject and trained by repeated presentation. The
table shows the letters’ possible meanings in French (as used in the experiment)
and their English translation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016173.t001
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measures ANOVA using outcome type (Reward trials,
No-Reward trials, Extinction trials) and map as within-subject
factors. P-values of post-hoc single comparisons were Bonferroni
corrected.
Source localization
In order to estimate the brain regions accounting for the
different electrocortical map configurations, source localization
was applied using a distributed linear inverse solution based on a
Local Auto-Regressive Average (LAURA) model comprising a
solution space of 3005 nodes [57]. Current distribution was
calculated within the grey matter of the average brain provided by
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Similar to statistical
parametric mapping (SPM) used in fMRI studies, we computed
the contrasts of local electrical current densities between the three
outcome types with time-point wise paired t-tests in the periods in
which the map configurations significantly differed, that is, 200–
300 ms and 485–635 ms. P values were Bonferroni corrected by
the number of electrodes, so that only nodes with p,.0004 for at
least 20 ms were retained [45].
Results
Subjective ratings
Subjects consistently preferred the letter signaling reward (VAS,
6.762.6, mean 6 SD) over the two letters indicating absence of
reward (No-Reward, VAS, 3.461.9; Extinction, VAS, 462.7;
F(2,34) =14.278, p=.00003), the latter two obtaining similar
pleasantness scores. They reported having differently anticipated
the outcome types (ANOVA, F(2,34) =5.33; p=.009). Reward
trials (VAS, 761.4) were more anticipated than No-Reward trials
(5.362) (p=.007) and Extinction trials (5.562.5) (p=.02), whereas
No-Reward and Extinction trials were equally anticipated
(p=.65).
Task performance
The task proved very easy: subjects made only 1.861.2% (mean
6 SD) unforced errors. The outcome type of the previous trial
influenced accuracy (ANOVA, F(2,34)=42; p,.001) and reaction
times (F(2,34)=6.6; p=.004). Participants made more errors after
Extinction trials (3.562.2%) than after Reward trials
(0.0260.07%; p,.001) and No-Reward trials (0.1460.3%;
p,.001). Trials following No-Reward trials and Reward trials
did not differ (p=0.78). Reaction times (response latencies) were
longer in trials following an Extinction trial (5706102 ms) than
after Reward trials (5426100 ms; p=0.03) and tended to be
longer than after No-Reward trials (5556102 ms, p=0.1). Trials
following No-Reward and Reward trials did not differ (p=0.37).
Waveform analysis
Analysis of waveforms indicated two main periods of significant
amplitude differences after stimulus onset: approximately 200–
300 ms and 450–650 ms (Figure 2). Extinction trials induced a
more positive frontal (AF7, AFz, AF8, FCz) and negative posterior
(PO7, Oz, PO8) response than No-Reward and Reward trials
between 200–300 ms. Towards the end of this period, around
300 ms, No-Reward trials elicited a typical feedback-related
negativity (Figure 2) characterized by a more negative deflection
at frontal electrodes (AFz, FCz) and a more positive deflection at
lateral posterior electrode PO7 than Reward trials and Extinction
trials (200 and 300 ms).
Between 450–650 ms, Extinction trials elicited a more negative
lateral frontal (AF7, AF8) and more positive central responses (Cz,
Pz) than the two other trial types, corresponding to a late P3
(Figure 2).
Topographic analysis
Spatio-temporal segmentation yielded 10 distinct potential map
configurations over 800 ms (Figure 3A). Figure 3B–D shows the
sequence of the dominant maps at any moment and the relative
strength of the maps (GFP) in response to the three outcome types.
The earliest and most striking difference appeared at 200–300 ms,
when Extinction trials evoked a configuration (map 5 in Figure 3D)
having opposite anterior-posterior polarity to the one evoked by
Reward and No-Reward trials (map 4 in Figure 3B–C ). Statistical
analysis confirmed an interaction of map X outcome type
regarding the presence of the two maps (Global Explained
Variance, GEV; F(2,34) =7.57, p,.001). Post-hoc tests confirmed
the stronger presence of map 5 in Extinction trials. Between 300
and 485 ms, all three outcome types evoked the same map
configurations, although one configuration (map 6 in Figure 3) was
significantly longer present in Reward (Figure 3B) and No-Reward
(Figure 3C) than Extinction trials (Figure 3D)( F(2,34) =13.33,
p,.001).
Map configuration again significantly differed between 485 and
635 ms, when Extinction trials evoked a different configuration
(map 8 in Figure 3D) than Reward and No-Reward trials (maps 7
and 9). This difference was confirmed by a significant interaction
of map (maps 7, 8, 9, 10) X outcome type (GEV, F(6,102) =6.7,
p=.00001), which was due to a stronger presence of map 8 in
Extinction trials.
Differences between Reward and No-Reward trials were
discrete, the only significant difference being a longer duration
of an early map (map 4) between 200 and 300 ms in response to
Reward trials (F(1,17) =6.1, p=.02) and of map 7 in response to
No-Reward trials than the two other conditions (F(6,102) =7.1,
p=.001).
Source localization
Figure 4A,B shows that, between 200 and 300 ms, Extinction
trials induced significantly stronger activation than both Reward
and No-Reward trials in the posterior medial OFC, extending to
area 13, 10, 11, and 14. Between 485–635 ms, Extinction trials
induced stronger activation of the right posterior lateral OFC (area
47/12). In addition, in this late period, Extinction trials induced
extended, left-sided inferomedial temporo-occipital activity, in-
cluding the medial temporal lobe (Figure 4D,E). No area was more
active in Reward or No-Reward trials than Extinction trials. Areas
activated by Reward and No-Reward trials did not significantly
differ in either period (Figure 4C,F).
Discussion
The present study indicates that the behavioral relevance of an
outcome may be a stronger driver of early human cerebral activity
(and OFC activity in particular) than hedonic value. Absence of
reward elicited strikingly different electrocortical responses when it
signaled that the previously reward-predicting choice was no
longer valid (Extinction trials) than when it simply indicated non-
delivery of reward despite correct choice (No-Reward trials) or
when reward was delivered (Reward trials). Specifically, Extinction
trials evoked distinct electrocortical responses already at an early
stage of processing between 200–300 ms, which were evident in
the waveform analysis (Figure 2) and induced a significantly
different overall electrocortical map configuration (Figure 3).
Source estimation indicated that this difference emanated from
Outcome Monitoring
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than the other trial types (Figure 4).
The specific response to Extinction trials is in remarkable
agreement with an earlier study, in which subjects had to
anticipate ‘‘behind’’ which one of two colored rectangles an
‘‘object’’ was hidden. However, in contrast to previous studies on
outcome processing and the present study, no reward was
involved: subjects received no comment, no score, and no other
form of reward at the end of trials [42]. Despite absence of any
notion of reward, trials requiring a switch to the other rectangle in
the next trial evoked a specific electrocortical response with a
similar configuration as observed in the present study: there was a
strong positive potential over frontal electrodes and a specific map
configuration (with frontal positivity) at 200–300 ms. No such
potential was present when an unexpected but irrelevant change of
outcome occurred, namely, presentation of another object. The
present study shows that, when a gamble is about obtaining
reward or not, behavioral relevance of the absence of an outcome
is a stronger driver of electrocortical activity than the sole absence
of the expected reward.
Figure 2. Evoked potential curves in response to the three outcome types. Periods displaying significant amplitude differences between
two outcome types over at least 20 ms are indicated with bars. Numbers above the bars indicate significant differences between: 1, Extinction vs. No-
Reward trials; 2, Extinction vs. Reward trials; 3, Reward vs. No-Reward trials. The position of the corresponding electrodes is shown at the bottom
right. FRN, feedback-related-negativity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016173.g002
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cannot be due to differences in stimulus properties (such as, the use
of ‘‘$$’’ symbols or numbers), as all outcomes were signaled by
single letters whose significance was initially learned and which
varied between participants.
No-Reward and Reward trials induced only discretely different
responses, although these outcomes differed both with regards to
probability of occurrence and hedonic value: No-Reward trials
induced a more prominent frontal negativity around 300 ms
characteristic of the feedback-related negativity (FRN, Figure 2),
which is thought to reflect an erroneous or disadvantageous choice
[58,59,60,61]. This processing difference did not induce a
significantly different overall electrocortical map configuration
(Figure 3). Of note, in contrast to No-Reward trials, Extinction
trials did not induce a FRN. This observation is in agreement with
a recent study in which outcomes that preceded behavioral
adjustment in a probabilistic learning task did not induce a FRN
[62]. The finding underscores the idea that, in a situation in which
the non-occurrence of reward may or may not have behavioral
relevance, as in our task, the electrocortical response to the
behaviorally relevant absence of an outcome overrides the effect of
the simple processing of a disadvantageous outcome. Hence, the
strong frontal positivity induced by the processing of the
behavioral relevance inherent in Extinction trials may have
prevented the appearance of a FRN in response to these trials.
There was a second period, around 450–700 ms, when
Extinction trials induced a stronger late P3 component compared
to other trial types and a specific electrocortical map configuration
(Fig. 2,3D). This potential might reflect the determination to adapt
behavior in the subsequent trial, as a late P3 was also observed in
endogenously generated shifts of the perceptual rule during the
Wisconsin Card Sorting test (WCST) [63]. Source estimation
indicated that the trace and map differences reflected stronger
activity of right lateral OFC (area 47/12) and the left medial
temporal lobe (MTL, Fig. 4D,E); again, there was no significant
difference between No-reward and Reward trials. This activity
might be explained by the fact that our task was a reversal task, in
which Extinction trials not only indicated that the current
behavioral choice had to be abandoned (as in a pure extinction
task), but also that an alternative behavior was required in the next
trial. In primates, lateral orbitofrontal lesions induced a specific
deficit of object alternation [64]. Similarly, human functional
imaging showed activity of the lateral right OFC in reversal
learning [65,66]. A recent lesion study in monkeys performing an
analog of the WCST supported these interpretations: lesions of the
OFC impaired rapid reward-based updating of representations of
rule value –corresponding to the rapid processing of the
behaviorally relevant absence of an expected outcome in the
present study–, while ventrolateral prefrontal lesions impaired
implementation of previously acquired abstract rules –the
behavioral switch in our study [67].
The MTL activity at 450–700 ms might reflect encoding of the
last relevant event (the rectangle not followed by the anticipated
reward) or evocation of the memory of the alternate, currently
invisible, stimulus. This interpretation is compatible with an earlier
H2 [15]O PET study on reversal learning which showed stronger
MTL activation when the outcome of trials was relevant for
subsequent behavior than when subjects were asked to guess and
the outcome of trials was irrelevant for subsequent choices [41].
The localization of brain activity in the present study –OFC and
MTL– was based on source estimation using inverse solutions of
high-resolution EEG. This technique is capable of localizing
epileptic discharges emanating from the medial temporal lobe [68]
and correctly localized MTL activity in healthy subjects
performing a memory task [69], as confirmed by depth electrode
recordings in epileptic patients performing the same task [70].
There is no theoretical reason to consider the OFC a less
amenable region to this localization technique than the MTL, but
formal proof is lacking. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that
this localization is correct: healthy subjects performing a similar
task had strong activation of the posterior medial OFC [41]. This
result was reliable as it was obtained with H2 [15]O PET which
has no artifacts in this area, in contrast to fMRI, which is typically
heavily distorted by susceptibility artifacts induced by the adjacent
sinuses (normalization procedures may hide, but cannot compen-
sate for these artifacts) [71,72]. Most importantly, patients with
lesions of the medial OFC have difficulty in abandoning a
previously correct choice in reversal learning [39], a failure that is
strongly associated with disorientation and behaviorally sponta-
neous confabulation in the acute phase [40]. Thus, the OFC
localization of the critical signal in the present task was not really
much of an issue; the study rather explored, in response to what
type of outcome stimulus (hence an event-related method) and
when (hence a rapid method) a specific brain response to outcomes
would be observed. The fact that the inverse solution technique
used here localized the main electrophysiological finding (specif-
ically stronger response at 200–300 ms in Extinction trials) to the
posterior medial OFC is, therefore, highly comforting and
indirectly supports the localization potential of the method.
Figure 3. Electrocortical map configurations in response to the
different outcomes. A, Cortical maps obtained by segmenting the
grand-mean of the ERPs between 0 and 800 ms. B–D, sequence of the
maps between 0 ms and 800 ms after outcome presentation for each
condition and map strength expressed as the Global Field Power (GFP).
B, Reward trials; C, No-Reward trials; D, Extinction trials. Maps with
significantly different Global Explained Variance (GEV, a measure of how
well a map explains individual data) between the conditions are shown
with colored areas under the curves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016173.g003
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or ‘‘reversal trials’’ [74]) in this paper because only the cued
stimulus that no longer predicted reward was visible when the
outcome was presented, but not the alternate stimulus (the other
colored rectangle). Thus, these trials stressed the extinction phase
of reversal learning (abandonment of the hitherto valid cue), while
they did not show the stimulus with which the reward association
had to be established in the next trial. Disorientation and
behaviorally spontaneous confabulation are associated with failure
in this first phase of reversal [40]. The term extinction was used in
a generic sense, defined as the situation in which ‘‘one learns that
certain expectations no longer apply’’ [75], as in our experiment.
Pavlov had introduced the term to describe the weakening of a
conditioned reflex when a conditioned stimulus was not followed
by reinforcement [76]. This type of extinction has a known neural
substrate in animals: A specific deficit of extinction was observed in
monkeys with lesions of the posterior medial OFC, but not other
parts of the frontal lobes [64]. Single cell recordings showed that
this area contains a particularly high density of neurons that
exclusively increase their discharge rate when anticipated
reinforcements (rewards) fail to be delivered, that is, in trials
whose repetition would induce extinction [20,22]. Our hypothesis
is that the brain uses this very signal, which is evoked when an
anticipated outcome (reward) fails to occur, to keep thought and
behavior in phase with reality [40,77]. We suggest that this
capacity relies on singular events, similar to the Extinction trials of
our task, and does not require the repeated absence of
reinforcement necessary for the extinction of a conditioned reflex.
In anatomo-pharmacological terms, we suspect that the well-
known orbitofrontal-subcortical reward circuitry [23,78], which
has also been shown to participate in reality filtering [12,13],
assumes among many other functions also the one of signaling
when an upcoming thought does not relate to ongoing reality. The
present study supports the idea that the human OFC, in
accordance with single cell recordings in non-human primates,
does indeed produce such a signal when an anticipated reward
does not occur, provided the omission of reward is relevant for
subsequent behavior.
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